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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, by virtue of the
lack of general applicability of its individual mandate, violates the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment by forcing some individuals to personally pay a
separate abortion premium in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs.
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
A mici curiae are three national organizations whose members include
physicians, health care professionals and medical students with a profound interest
in defending the sanctity of human life in their dual roles as both health care
providers and consumers. A mici vigorously oppose abortion as contrary to
traditional, historical and Judeo-Christian medical ethics, as well as to their
sincerely held religious beliefs.
As professionals with a vocation to serve every member of the human
family, A mici are sensitive to healthcare disparities and are supportive of a variety
of public, private, and charitable efforts that address health care affordability and
accessibility. However, A mici have a profound interest in opposing the Act
because its imposition of the non-neutral individual mandate forces them in some
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29, A mici certify that all parties have consented to the
filing of this brief; no party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in
part; and no person other than A mici contributed money intended to fund the
brief’s preparation or submission.
1

1
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health plans to make separate personal payments for elective abortion in violation
of their sincerely held religious beliefs and moral convictions. A mici include the
following medical associations:
Catholic Medical Association (CMA) is a nonprofit national organization
founded in 1932 to assist Catholic physicians in upholding the principles of their
faith in the science and the practice of medicine and in witnessing to these
principles within the medical profession, the Church and society at large.
Comprised of over 1,500 members covering over 75 medical specialties, CMA
helps to educate the medical profession and society at large about issues in medical
ethics, including health care rights of conscience, through its annual conferences
and quarterly journal, The Linacre Quarterly; supports Catholic hospitals in
faithfully applying Catholic moral principles in health care delivery; and helps
Catholic physicians to collaborate and support one another in their common goal of
providing conscientious health care that respects the dignity of the human person.
Christian Medical and Dental Association (CMDA) is a nonprofit national
organization of Christian physicians and allied healthcare professionals with over
16,000 members. In addition to its physician members, it also has associate
members from a number of allied health professions, including nurses and
physician assistants. CMDA provides up-to-date information on the legislative,
ethical and medical aspects of defending conscience in health care for its members
2
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and other healthcare professionals, as well as for patients, institutions, and students
in training. CMDA is opposed to the practice of abortion as contrary to Scripture,
a respect for the sanctity of human life, and traditional, historical and JudeoChristian medical ethics.
Medical Students for Life of America (“MedSFLA”) is a nonprofit
national organization of future medical professionals committed to sustainable
patient healthcare improvement and ethical medicine. MedSFLA is an
unincorporated subdivision of Students for Life of America, representing a
combined 620 student groups in 48 states. The mission of MedSFLA is to highlight
a rediscovery of the patient-doctor relationship with care for every patient –
regardless of race, developmental stage, socioeconomic status, and special needs.

3
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A mici urge affirmance of the district court ruling, and present an additional
argument that demonstrates the unconstitutionality of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act2 (“the Act”): its individual mandate, which is not generally
applicable, imposes an “abortion premium mandate” that violates the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
The “individual mandate” found in Section 1501 of the Act provides that,
beginning in 2014, Americans must either purchase federally-approved health
insurance or pay a monetary penalty. Nestled within this “individual mandate” are
provisions collectively referred to herein as the “abortion premium mandate,”
which, as addressed in Section A, offend A mici’s most basic principles of
morality, and substantially burden their free exercise of religion.
As addressed more fully in Section B of this brief, the Act sought to include
plans that cover abortion, while attempting to segregate funds to avoid the
appearance of federal funding of abortion. It achieved this under Section 1303 by
mandating that the issuer of a federally subsidized plan that covers elective
abortions “shall” obtain a separate and private payment from every enrollee,

2

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) as amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
4
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without exception, to be used by the insurer solely for the payment of other
people’s elective abortions. Act, § 1303(b)(2)(B).
In conjunction with the forced purchase required by the individual mandate,
Section 1303’s abortion premium mandate directly encumbers the conscience and
free exercise rights of millions of Americans by imposing an unconstitutional
burden on them within the private insurance marketplace. Members of A mici
medical associations and their similarly-situated patients are subject under the Act
to being unwillingly enrolled by their employer in a plan that covers abortion; or
alternatively, A mici have their choices impermissibly limited under the Act by
being forced to choose between plans that respect their conscience versus other
plans that may better meet their health needs or their choice of doctor network, but
would require them to personally pay an abortion premium.
Although such government imposed burdens might arguably be permissible
if imposed through a neutral and generally applicable law under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), they are
impermissible here because the Act as a whole—and the individual mandate in
particular—are not generally applicable. As discussed in Section C, Section 1501
provides express statutory exceptions to the individual mandate for certain
religious objections, but not for religious objections to abortion. The lack of

5
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general applicability is further demonstrated by the hundreds of waivers to the
individual mandate granted by the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services on a case by case basis. Because the Act and its individual
mandate do not meet Smith’s neutral and general applicability standard, it is
subject to strict scrutiny, a standard it cannot meet.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ACT AND ITS NON-NEUTRAL INDIVIDUAL
MANDATE VIOLATE THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE BY
IMPOSING AN “ABORTION PREMIUM MANDATE”
WITHOUT REGARD TO RELIGIOUS OBJECTION
A. Our nation has a long and deeply-rooted history of
respecting and protecting the conscience rights of
individuals not to be forced into the practice or funding of
elective abortion
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the sensitive and emotional nature of

the abortion controversy” provokes “vigorous opposing views” and inspires “deep
and seemingly absolute convictions.” Roe v. W ade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). The
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence is replete with the understanding that the
practice of human abortion has “profound moral and spiritual implications,”
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992), and that “men and women

6
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of good conscience can disagree” about those implications and can find abortion
“offensive to [their] most basic principles of morality.” Id.
Although legal, this Court has recognized that “reasonable people” will
differ as to the morality of abortion, id.at 853, and “there are common and
respectable reasons for opposing it.” Bray v. A lexandria W omen’s Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993). Indeed, as recently as the 2000 Carhart decision, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that “[m]illions of Americans believe that life
begins at conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death
of an innocent child,” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000).
In the wake of Roe, federal and state laws were quickly enacted to ensure
that no provider or hospital should be forced to participate in abortions against
their will. A full forty-seven states3 have enacted laws to protect health care
practitioners’ right of conscience to some degree or another, many providing full
exemptions to any health care practitioner who conscientiously declines to
participate in abortion. See, e.g., Fl. Stat. Ann. § 390.0111(8) (“No person . . . who
shall state an objection to such procedure on moral or religious grounds shall be
required to participate in the procedure which will result in the termination of

3

See, e.g., Protection of Conscience Project, States and Territories, available at
http://www.consciencelaws.org/laws/usa/law-usa-01.html (last visited May 7,
2011).
7
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pregnancy.”).4 In many ways, the widespread agreement to protect provider
conscience is unique in our history, and ranks the right of individual conscience in
the abortion area as, in fact, fundamental.5
A similar history from Roe to the present arises on the question of whether
individual taxpayers may be forced to contribute to abortion services with their tax
dollars. Responding to the conscience objections of millions of Americans,
Congress endeavored from 1976 onward to make clear with the annual passage of
a budget rider known as the Hyde Amendment that while Roe had made abortion
legal, federal funds collected from taxpayers would not be used for elective
abortions.6 The Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment in Harris v. McRae,

4

For a broader discussion of the widespread adoption of such conscience
provisions in the wake of Roe v. W ade, see Mark L. Rienzi, The Constitutional
Right to Refuse: Roe, Casey, and the Fourteenth A mendment Rights of Healthcare
Providers, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 39 (forthcoming October 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1749788 (last visited April 29,
2011).
5

See Rienzi at 10-11, supra note 4 (“In light of the long history of legal and ethical
prohibitions on abortion in many contexts until the 1970s, and the repeated, nearly
unanimous, and nearly universal legislative actions to protect objectors after Roe,
this Part concludes that a right to refuse to participate in abortions satisfies the
Court’s traditional analysis for protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.”)
Consistent with a legal analysis of the Act by the Office of the General Counsel
for the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the phrase “elective abortion” is used
in this brief to refer to abortions that have long been ineligible for federal funding
in major health programs – specifically, all abortions except for cases of rape,
6

8
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448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980), recognizing that “[a]bortion is inherently different from
other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful
termination of a potential life.”7

incest, or danger to the life of the mother. The term is used here not as an
expression of medical or moral judgment, but rather as shorthand for longstanding
federal policy. For a cogent yet comprehensive analysis of how the Act impacts
abortion funding and conscience issues beyond the “abortion premium mandate”
addressed in this brief, see Anthony Picarello and Michael Moses, Legal A nalysis
of the Provisions of the Patient Protection and A ffordable Care A ct and
Corresponding Executive Order Regarding A bortion Funding and Conscience
Protection, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (March 25, 2010),
available at http://www.usccb.org/healthcare/03-25-10Memo-re-Executive-OrderFinal.pdf (last visited May 7, 2011)(“USCCB Memo”).
7

The Court has since eschewed this inaccurate “potential life” terminology and
instead used terms such as “ending fetal life,” and recognizing the state’s interest
in “protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus.” Gonazles v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992),. In
fact, the Gonzales majority was unequivocal in recognizing that abortion destroys a
separate human life when it stated: “It is, however, precisely this lack of
information concerning the way in which the fetus will be killed that is of
legitimate concern to the State. The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a
choice is well informed.” Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
This is supported by modern developmental biology establishing that at every
phase of human embryonic and fetal development, the unborn child is not a
“potential life,” but rather an individual human being. See, e.g., William Larsen,
Human Embryology 4 (3rd ed. 2001)(explaining that male and female sex cells
“unite at fertilization to initiate the embryonic development of a new
individual.”)(emphasis added); see also Maureen L. Condic, Ph.D., W hen Does
Human Life Begin? A Scientific Perspective, Westchester Institute White Paper
(October 2008), available at
http://www.westchesterinstitute.net/images/wi_whitepaper_life_ print.pdf (the
human zygote (single cell phase) has “all the properties of a fully complete (albeit
immature) human organism; it is ‘an individual constituted to carry on the
9
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To be clear, A mici emphasize that this brief does not address the hotly
debated issue of whether the Act enables direct federal funding of elective abortion
due to the omission of a Hyde-like amendment.8 Nor does it address future threats
to the conscience protections of healthcare providers due to the omission of
longstanding conscience protections that were not applied to the Act’s separate
funding stream.9 Despite the important and valid concerns surrounding federal
funding of abortion or threats to provider conscience, the speculative nature of how
the Act might or might not be implemented in the future makes these issues not yet
ripe for judicial review. See, A bbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967).
activities of life by means of organs separate in function but mutually dependent: a
living being.’”(citing the Medical Dictionary of the National Library of Medicine,
available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/mplusdictionary.html).
8

See USCCB Memo, supra, note 6.

9

Id; See also Michael A. Fragoso, Note, Taking Conscience Seriously or Seriously
Taking Conscience?: Obstetricians, Specialty Boards, and the Takings Clause, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 114 (forthcoming July 2011) (“As the PPACA contains
its own revenue stream (not relying on general omnibus Congressional
appropriations), the Hyde-Weldon and Church Amendments would not
apply to it. Further, the Act was passed without a comprehensive conscience
rider—although Senator Tom Coburn (an obstetrician) of Oklahoma proposed one.
The result is that the Act contains the potential to contravene established
physicians’ conscience protections in the area of reproductive health in its
regulatory interpretation.”); see also, Helen Alvare, How the New Healthcare Law
Endangers Conscience, June 29, 2010, available at
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/06/1402 (last visited April 29, 2011).
10
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Rather, this brief focuses narrowly on the concrete provisions of the Act’s
“abortion premium mandate” that substantially burden the conscience and free
exercise rights of millions of Americans.
B. The “Abortion Premium Mandate” violates conscience and
free exercise rights by forcing enrollees in certain health
plans to personally pay a premium to a private insurer
dedicated to covering other people’s elective abortions.
The “individual mandate” that compels Americans by threat of penalty to
purchase only federally-approved health insurance plans results in the imposition
of another unconstitutional mandate: the “abortion premium mandate.”
Under Section 1303 of the Act, all individuals who, even unwittingly, are
enrolled in a plan – either on their own or by their employer – that happens to
include elective abortion coverage must pay a separate premium from their own
pocket to the insurer’s actuarial fund designated solely to pay for other people’s
elective abortions.
Section 1303(b)(1)(B)(i) of the Act refers to elective abortions as “Abortions
For Which Public Funding is Prohibited” ( “elective abortions”).10 The Act then
provides that the issuer “shall estimate the basic per enrollee, per month cost,
determined on an average actuarial basis, for including coverage under a qualified
health plan of the services described in paragraph (1)(B)(i) [i.e., elective
10

See USCCB Memo, supra note 6, addressing “elective abortions” as any
abortion other than in cases of rape, incest or danger to the life of the mother.
11
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abortions].” Act, §1303(b)(1)(D)(i). Section 1303(b)(1)(D)(ii) mandates that the
abortion premium mandate shall not be estimated “at less than $1 per enrollee, per
month.”
The enrollee must separately pay the abortion premium from his or her own
private funds by virtue of the provision of the Act stating that in plans covering
elective abortion, “the issuer of the plan shall not use any amount attributable to”
either tax credits or “cost-sharing reductions” for “the purposes of paying for
[elective abortion] services.” Act, § 1303(b)(2)(A).
The abortion premium mandate applies without exception for Americans
who have conscience objections to abortion, and even without the ability for
enrollees to decline abortion coverage for any reason, even on the basis that the
enrollee is a man who would never need reimbursement for an abortion. Act, §
1303 (b)(2)(B)(i) (abortion premium “shall” be collected “without regard to the
enrollee’s age, sex, or family status.”).
Ironically, the offending language arose out of an attempt by Senator Ben
Nelson, a pro-life Democrat, to find language that would “make it clear that [the
healthcare bill] does not fund abortion with government money.”11 After first

11

A bortion Haggling Looms Over Health Care Debate in Senate, (November 10,
2009), available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/11/10/abortionhaggling-looms-health-care-debate-senate#ixzz1LF6XshKX (last visited May 2,
2011).
12
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threatening a filibuster unless the Senate version included the pro-life Stupak
amendment that mirrored the Hyde Amendment, Senator Nelson later agreed to
accept certain negotiated language. Now codified at Section 1303 of the Act, the
“Nelson Compromise” allows the federal government to break with former federal
policy12 by allowing Americans to use federal tax credits and subsidies to buy
plans that include abortion coverage, provided that their federal subsidies are not
applied by insurance companies toward the abortion coverage in such plans. As
explained above, this was achieved by mandating enrollees in such plans to make a
separate payment from their own private funds to an insurance account designated
solely for the payment of other people’s elective abortions. 13 The “abortion

12

The Act is not in accord with the consistent federal policy since 1996. As
explained by the Heritage Foundation before passage of the Act:
The FEHBP (Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan) provides
insurance for millions of federal workers, including Members of
Congress. Administered through the federal Office of Personnel
Management, FEHBP lets workers choose from a variety of different
health insurance plans, but since1996 the law has required all of these
plans to exclude abortion coverage, excepting only rape, incest and
the life of the mother. And it’s not just FEHBP. Military insurance
through TRICARE does not cover abortion unless the mother’s life is
at risk. Nor does the Indian Health Service.
Ernest Istook, The Real Status Quo on A bortion and Federal Insurance, The
Heritage Foundation (November 11, 2009), available at
http://blog.heritage.org/2009/11/11/the-real-status-quo-on-abortion-andfederal-insurance/ (last visited May 5, 2011).
13

Another part of the compromise was the inclusion of “State Opt-Out of
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premium mandate,” although not referred to as such, was accurately described by a
court in the Western District of Virginia:
In plans that do provide non-excepted [elective] abortion14
coverage, a separate payment for non-excepted [elective] abortion
services must be made by the policyholder to the insurer, and the
insurer must deposit those payments in a separate allocation account
that consists solely of those payments; the insurer must use only the
amounts in that account to pay for non-excepted [elective] abortion
services. Act § 1303(b)(2)(B), (C).
Insurers are prohibited from using funds attributable to
premium tax credits or [federal] cost-sharing reductions … to pay for
non-excepted [elective] abortion services. Act § 1303(b)(2)(A).
Liberty University v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299, at *24 (W.D. Va. Nov.
30, 2010).15

Abortion” provision. Under Section 1303(a), a “State may elect to prohibit
abortion coverage in qualified health plans offered through an Exchange in such
State,” but a State may later “repeal” such law “and provide for the offering of
[abortion] services through the Exchange.” As of the filing of this brief, only eight
states had enacted “opt-out” laws: Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia. See NCSL, Health Reform and A bortion
Coverage in the Insurance Exchanges (April 2011), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=21099 (last visited May 5, 2011).
14

The court is using the phrase “non-excepted” to describe elective abortions (all
abortions other than those in cases of rape, incest or life of the mother). Act,
§1303(b)(1)(B); see also USCCB Memo, supra, note 6.
15

The federal district court in Liberty University v. Geithner focused on the
provisions that prohibit federal subsidies from being applied to abortion coverage,
missing the point of plaintiffs’ argument about the unconstitutional nature of
compelling individuals to personally pay into a segregated private abortion fund
against their consciences and sincerely held religious beliefs.
14
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Thus while Section 1303 cleverly (though superficially) avoids the direct use
of taxpayer funds to pay for elective abortions, it does so by forcing private
individuals to fund them directly from their own pockets, and without regard to
conscientious objection to the direct and personal funding of abortion.
To make matters worse, the Act does not require clear and sufficient
advance notice of which plans in the Exchange contain coverage for elective
abortion. In fact, the Act seems to provide to the contrary, such that Americans
could easily be forced by the individual mandate into the unwitting purchase of an
abortion plan that causes them to personally pay for elective abortions, against
their sincerely held religious beliefs:
(3) RULES RELATING TO NOTICE.—
(A) NOTICE.—A qualified health plan that provides for coverage of
the services described in paragraph (1)(B)(i) [elective abortion] shall
provide a notice to enrollees, only as part of the summary of benefits
and coverage explanation, at the time of enrollment, of such
coverage.
(B) RULES RELATING TO PAYMENTS.—The notice described in
subparagraph (A), any advertising used by the issuer with respect to
the plan, any information provided by the Exchange, and any other
information specified by the Secretary shall provide information only
with respect to the total amount of the combined payments
for services described in paragraph (1)(B)(i) [elective abortion] and
other services covered by the plan.
Act, § 1303(b)(3) (emphasis added).

15
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The Act and its individual mandate thus forces A mici and citizens with
similar religious beliefs and moral convictions into the untenable position of
having limited health insurance choices. In order to have the same choices as other
citizens, the members of the A mici medical organizations must be willing to
violate their consciences by entering into private contracts – possibly unwittingly
or unwillingly – with private insurers in which they must actively cooperate with
their personal funds in the payment of elective abortions.
C. The Act and the Individual Mandate are invalid because they
are not generally applicable and fail strict scrutiny.
For many of the millions of Americans who oppose abortion, being forced
by the government to pay for abortions – not with tax dollars, but directly out of
their own pockets – will violate their deeply held religious beliefs or moral
convictions. As the Supreme Court has explained:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and
to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is
nonetheless substantial.
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).

16
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Accordingly, the individual mandate combined with the abortion insurance
mandate imposes a substantial burden on the Free Exercise rights of millions of
Americans.
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), the government is generally free to impose substantial burdens on
religion, so long as those burdens are imposed by neutral and generally applicable
law. Here, however, the burden is imposed by a law that does not meet Smith’s
neutral and generally applicable standard. Accordingly, the individual mandate
that imposes the abortion premium mandate is subject to strict scrutiny under the
Free Exercise clause, a standard it cannot meet.
First, as has been well-documented in the media, the Act is rife with
exceptions and the Department of Health and Human Services has granted
hundreds of waivers from its provisions on a case by case basis.16 By definition,
the existence of such a system of waivers renders the law not generally applicable.
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu A ye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 53738 (1993)(“As we noted in Smith, in circumstances in which individualized

16

See, e.g., Making Exceptions in Obama’s Health Care A ct Draws Kudos, and
Criticism, Robert Pear, The New Y ork Times, March 20, 2011 at A21 (noting
waivers “for more than 1,000 health plans covering 2.6 million people. . .
.[E]xceptions like these have become increasingly common. They provide wiggle
room in a law originally thought to be strict and demanding. Maine has just won a
three-year reprieve from a provision of the law . . .”).
17
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exemptions from a general requirement are available, the government ‘may not
refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling
reason.’ Respondent's application of the ordinance's test of necessity devalues
religious reasons . . . by judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious
reasons. Thus, religious practice is being singled out for discriminatory
treatment.”).
Second, the individual mandate itself is subject to several exceptions
allowing individuals to opt-out for various reasons—including some apparently
government-approved religious reasons—but not for religious objection to
personally funding abortion. For example, section 1501 of the Act exempts from
the individual mandate those who are members of a “recognized religious sect or
division” with “established tenets or teachings” barring the “acceptance of benefits
of any private or public insurance.” Section 1501 also exempts other groups,
including those participating in “health care sharing ministries,” native Americans,
and the poor. The existence of these exceptions demonstrates that the government
does not actually need to force every individual to purchase healthcare insurance.
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547 (no compelling interest where government “fails to
enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or
alleged harm of the same sort”).

18
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In light of these waivers and exemptions, it simply cannot be said that the
Act is a generally applicable law. Simply put, the law does not apply generally at
all. Accordingly, the Act is subject to strict scrutiny.
Here, the Act itself shows that there is no compelling interest in forcing all
Americans to purchase health insurance. Both the statutory exceptions and the
hundreds of waivers confirm that the individual mandate clearly does not need to
be imposed in every case, and that the government judges some reasons (though
apparently not conscientious objection to abortion) to be sufficiently important to
trump its interests. See, e.g., Lukumi 508 U.S. at 546 (strict scrutiny failed where
the “proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous non-religious
conduct”). As such, the Act’s individual mandate that imposes an abortion
premium mandate is invalid under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the final judgment of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Florida should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
__________________________________
Nikolas T. Nikas
Dorinda C. Bordlee
Counsel of Record
BIOETHICS DEFENSE FUND
6811 E. Voltaire Avenue
Scottsdale, AZ 85254
(480) 483-3597
dbordlee@bdfund.org
Mark L. Rienzi
Assistant Professor of Law
The Catholic University of America
COLUMBUS SCHOOL OF LAW
3600 John McCormack Rd., NE
Washington, D.C. 20064
(202) 319-4970
Timothy J. Casey
SCHMITT, SCHNECK, SMYTH & HERROD, PC
1221 E. Osborn Road, Suite 105
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Phone: (602) 277-7000
Christopher A. Ferrara
AMERICAN CATHOLIC LAWYERS ASSOC.
P.O. Box 10092
Fairfield, NJ 07004
(973) 244-9895
DATED: May 9, 2011
20

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 05/11/2011

Page: 28 of 30

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-face and volume
limitations set forth in Rule 32(a)(7(C) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

The relevant body of the brief contains 4367 words. I relied on my

word processor, Microsoft Word: Mac 2011, to obtain the count.
DATED: May 9, 2011

____________________________
Dorinda C. Bordlee

21

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 05/11/2011

Page: 29 of 30

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 9, 2011, I caused the requisite number of copies
of the foregoing brief to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court by the
appellate CM/ECF system, and for paper copies to be delivered by no later than
May 11, 2011 to the Court and to each of the following by overnight courier
service:
Neal Kumar Katyal
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Civil Division, Room 7531
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
David Boris Rivkin, Jr.
BAKER & HOSTETLERT LLP
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20036
Carlos Ramos-Mrosvsky
BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
45 Rockefeller Plaza, 11th Floor
New York, New York 10111
Larry James Obhof, Jr.
BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
1900 E. 9th Street, Suite 3200
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
Blaine H. Winship
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA
The Capitol, Suite PL-01
400 South Monroe Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
22

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 05/11/2011

Page: 30 of 30

Katherine Jean Spohn
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEBRASKA
2115 State Capitol
Lincoln, Nebraska 68509
William James Cobb III
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
209 W. 14th Street
Austin, Texas 78711
Gregory Katsas
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20001-2105

____________________________
Dorinda C. Bordlee

23

